In the past generation, restitution law has emerged as global phenomenon. From
international materials than a comparable work on the American law of contracts or torts. 3 The lone treatise was written in the 1970's and reflects the scholarly modality of a different era. 4 No more than two or three, out of more than 170 U.S. law schools, offer a course devoted exclusively to restitution, nor, should a school want to offer such a course, is there an updated restitution casebook to use for the course. 5 Only a handful of conferences have been dedicated to restitution, and these events are typically dominated by non-U.S.-based scholars. 6 Finally, leading U.S. contracts casebooks, the place American lawyers are most likely to learn anything about restitution, offer a hesitant, uncertain and (from the Commonwealth perspective) under-rationalized account of unjust enrichment. 7 In sum, none of the excitement and stimulation that prevails in the rest of the common law world is to be found in the U.S. academy. The casebook contains separate sections for unjust enrichment/quasi contracts, precontractual liability and restitutionbased remedies, and makes no serious attempt at connecting the underlying rationales. The same organizational structure dominates Farnsworth's influential three volume treatise, see FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (3 rd ed. 2004). 8 See for example the opening paragraph of Michael Sean Quinn's book review, Subrogation, Restitution and Indemnity, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1361 REV. (1996 , of Charles Mitchell, THE LAW OF SUBROGATION (Oxford 1994) . The American author finds it necessary to explain and apologize to his US audience for reviewing a dense analytical English book on the "sleepy" law of subrogation. His explanation: it has bearing on a redistributional topic. See infra Part IV. 9 The development of the doctrinal field is sketched out in Andrew Kull But the idea of a unified field, combining quasi-contracts, reformation of deeds and constructive trusts, has not quite persevered in American legal thought. Thus, even as U.S. courts episodically rely on the First Restatement to supply a rule of decision in a given case, the analytical framing of these decisions typically proceed under the rubric of some codified area of the law (e.g., Federal Bankruptcy Code, UCC, ERISA, insurance regulations), 20 or through the lens of contract, tort, property and trust, but most often contract and tort. 21 The idea, now quite popular in the Commonwealth, that restitution is its own body of law with policies and principles distinct from contract and tort, has not enjoyed similar vitality in American jurisprudence.
While the rebirth of restitution in the Commonwealth has been fueled principally by academic scholarship, this success would be impossible without the receptivity of the courts. Since the early 1990's, the English House of Lords decided several important restitution cases, affording the Oxbridge scholars a chance to argue their views into the law. 22 Moreover, at times it seems that the entire block of litigation known as the Swaps Cases were essentially an extended session of one of Birks' celebrated Oxford seminars with the Law Lords participating as diligent students. While the English academics initially piqued judicial interest in a rational account of restitution, the enthusiastic involvement of the House of Lords legitimated the enterprise, encouraging further academic discussion. Restitution is a joint enterprise of the bench and the academy. 19 in the U.S., courts barely seem interested in the matter. To be sure, there are plenty of cases regarding unjust enrichment, quasi contracts, constructive trusts, tracing, reformation of deeds and the refunding of mistaken payments, most often in the context of commercial transactions gone awry. But these cases are rarely presented before the highest courts, and in any event, do not result in theory-laden opinions that attract scholarly attention. The cases are treated summarily, little more than the day-to-day work product of the courts.
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The overall tone and texture of the American cases contrast sharply with the urgency and significance that permeates the leading English cases.
This article explains the divergence in restitution between the U.S. and the Commonwealth. I argue that the Commonwealth restitution discourse is largely a product of pre-or anti-realist legal thought which thus generates skepticism from the mainstream American academic establishment. The paper then identifies the two dominant camps in American private law thought, the left-leaning redistributionalists, and the center-right law and economics movement, showing why neither camp has much use for the Birksean restitution discourse. The paper concludes by analyzing the lone exception to the overall U.S. indifference-the emerging drafts of the Restatement of Restitution-and a discussion of the direction of restitution scholarship in America.
II. The Analytic Basis of Commonwealth Restitution
The resurgence of the modern law of restitution is justly credited to the lifelong work of Peter Birks. When the law of property has done its job, on what principle could any court rely on to adjust the result? A single step in that direction would be the beginning of an impossible inquiry, just the kind of impossible inquiry which was once thought to be threatened by the law of unjust enrichment, until it was realised that the law of unjust enrichment was not a discretionary frolic in distributive justice. 33 Thus, when a court awards an in rem remedy to certain assets, it is because (and only because) the underlying concepts of unjust enrichment and property mandate such a result. Therefore, every remedial grant must be precisely and exactingly justified in terms of a pre-rationalized basis of liability. This rationalization effort is the central task of unjust enrichment theory.
The goal of Birks' restitution discourse is to bring these related doctrines under a single heading. This will help identify the common legal principles at work, and reframe the sprawling case law in terms of the causative event of unjust enrichment and its legitimate legal responses. Once presented in analytic terms, the concept of unjust enrichment, typified by the core case of a mistaken payment, becomes the basis for further development in hard cases.
34
This reconstruction is said to achieve three related goals that are often associated with formal modes of legal analysis: (i) to ensure that like cases are treated alike, (ii) to provide a deductive framework for the analysis of novel questions, moving the system towards its ideal of gaplessness, and (iii) to restrain judicial forays into unbridled redistributive projects. This final goal of judicial restraint, while always important, is particularly necessary in a field where "unjust" serves as the central term in the legal discourse.
To understand the disparity between U.S. and Commonwealth approaches to It is exactly this mode of reasoning (expressed in rather extreme fashion by Birks) , that lies at the foundation of the modern restitution enterprise, and which engenders deep skepticism within U.S. academy. Though the legacy of American legal realism is justly debated, 37 a recurring feature of the movement is its looming suspicion of categoric divisions between doctrinal headings such as public and private or contract, 35 Birks understood this well, See UNJUST ENRICHMENT at 3 (comparing his project in restitution to the late 19 th century projects in contract and tort). 36 This skepticism is a subset of a more general suspicion of the explanatory power of inductive and deductive modes of legal reasoning and argument. In one popular retelling, the key insight of realism was to render the categorical description of the law meaningless since the lines between the doctrinal categories were shown to be permeable and could be made to bend at will. 39 Realists similarly doubted that legal reasoning alone could decide which category any given case fit into, or even whether it was possible to provide a consistent description of the legal category itself. As a result, realists began to look for extra-doctrinal justifications for legal outcomes. Explaining the decision via the conceptual analysis of legal rules would no longer do.
More developed iterations of the critique explained that cases defied easy categorization because each decision was subject to conflicting considerations between competing, and in some sense irreconcilable, objectives. Every instance of adjudication presents a localized act of balancing between competing interests that the legal system can neither fully realize nor reconcile. 40 On this view, the law is effectively a moving average of decisions. Further, because precedents inevitably point in both directions, the search for underlying coherence is bound to end in failure, as ongoing litigation ensures the systematic reproduction of conflicting data points throughout the legal canon. The realists thus understood that while judges inevitably balance these conflicting rules, their decisions cannot be justified via reference to the indeterminate rules or precedents themselves. 41 Moreover, to the extent that legal principles exist, they are the irreconcilable interests that reside at the edge a legal field, rather, than as Birks would have it, at the very center. 38 E.g., Morton Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870 -1960 at 198-208 (1992 . 39 See id. 40 These ideas which at first seem trite and wholly harmonious are in fact profoundly in conflict. The first and the fourth proceed from the premise that justice is to be known after the event. . . The second and the third proceed from the premise that that justice is to be known before the event in transactions voluntarily entered into.. . . the conflict between these two standpoints is perennial; it can be traced though the history of the law of contracts and noted in nearly every debatable question; there is no reason to think that it can ever be gotten rid of or to suppose that the present compromises of the issue will be any more permanent than the other compromises that have gone before.
While there was broad agreement amongst the realists that the motivation for legal outcomes is not the doctrinal rules themselves, but something else. Exactly what that something else is has been the concern of most mid-to-late twentieth century legal theory. The proposals differ wildly, from law and economics based efficiency concerns, to moral reasoning, to critical theories from the perspective of class, race, gender and ideological affiliation, to political science and institutional design models, accounts based on historical accidents, public choice theories and so forth. What these movements share, however, is their realist heritage. They agree that the move from cases to broader principles and then back down to a specific decision is neither descriptively accurate of what courts actually do nor a sufficient legitimization of the results. Post-realist American legal thought is an ongoing search for a compelling replacement to traditional doctrinal analysis.
42 42 Formalism of course exists in the U.S. However, at present it seems to be anchored in a discussion about the role of texts, particularly as related to public law. There seems to be little equivalent to Birks' conceptual mapping of the private law. Even Justice Scalia, America's most celebrated essentialist-For reasons too complex to outline here, this view of law was never as influential in England and the Commonwealth, as the success of the Birksean restitution project bears proof. 43 This is not to suggest that there are no doctrinally skeptical post-realist voices in the English academy. 44 But this is to suggest that the intellectual climate of the English and Commonwealth academy affords the possibility that pre (or anti-) realist strand of scholarship will find a home in the elite segments of the academy which exerts significant influence over the elite bench and bar. Similarly, I do not mean to suggest that Commonwealth restitution scholarship is monolithic. 45 Birks' views are far from being unanimous, and in many important respects were far too Romanist for common lawyers, as the Australian experience bears out. 44 There certainly are, and from this side of the Atlantic, the Birkbeck school appears to lead the field in the U.K. 45 See, e.g., Andrew Burrows, Contract, Tort and Restitution -A Satisfactory Division or Not?" 99 L.Q.R. 217 (1983) . 46 See e.g., Roxborough v. Rothmans, [2001] 208 CLR 516 at 544 (AU):
Considerations such as these, together with practical experience, suggest caution in judicial acceptance of any all-embracing theory of restitutionary rights and remedies founded upon a notion of "unjust enrichment". To the lawyer whose mind has been moulded by civilian influences, the theory may come first, and the source of the theory may be the writing of jurists not the decisions of judges. However, that is not the way in which a system based on case law develops; over time, general principle is derived from judicial decisions upon particular instances, not the other way around. See also id. at note 112 citing scholarly commentary to the same effect. 47 damages based solely on the parties' expectation, traditionally, the heart of contract damages, offers the least compelling rationale.
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Having inverted the traditional hierarchy, Fuller demonstrates that the divisions between the three interests are more imagined than real. Fuller's breakdown of the reliance/restitution distinction presents a key component of the realist aversion to Birks'
scheme. Fuller argues:
The inescapable flexibility of the concept of benefit means that drawing the line between reliance and restitution interest is in the end a rather arbitrary affair. By substituting for "benefit" a stricter term like "enrichment" we shift the line in one direction; by substituting a looser term like "performance received by the promisor" we shift it in another. Despite the linguistic and terminological complexity, the realist finds the goals of the Birksean restitution discourse to be relatively simple: to retroactively legitimate, and proscriptively regulate, the courts' overtly redistributive activities.
IV. Redistributive Restitution
Although U.S. scholars have been notably absent from the Oxonian discourse, a different vision of restitution has generated a significant amount of excitement and controversy within the American academy. This restitution discourse is premised on the core assumptions of legal realism and openly embraces the court's redistributive powers.
Restitution is interpreted as a legal framework through which justice concerns precluded by traditional legal doctrine find their expression in the law. 77 Thus while the Birksean analysis actively suppresses restitution's equitable history, 78 the redistributive version explicitly keys off the natural law tones that hover over the terms "unjust" and "equity."
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A few recent examples demonstrate this point.
To the American scholar, the natural law imagery embedded in the term "unjust enrichment" makes it an obvious candidate to address arguably the greatest injustice of the twentieth century, the Nazi Holocaust. had much less success in practice, it has engendered a wide-ranging debate within the legal academy. 87 While to date, no money has changed hands and a class action lawsuit for reparations has recently been dismissed, 88 a number of commentators nevertheless note that, to the extent these claims have a chance of success, restitution/unjust enrichment remains that most promising legal avenue. The pliability and natural law overtones of the word "unjust" help plaintiffs get around the fact that slavery was legal under the positive of the pre-Civil War era. At the more doctrinal level, a suit in restitution obviates the need for a showing of direct injury. Finally, since liability in restitution is strict, plaintiffs are relieved from proving negligence or wrongdoing on the part of the defendants, an obvious advantage where the suits proceed against those who had nothing to do with the actions in question. 89 Perhaps the farthest-reaching use of restitution rhetoric was the $350+ billion settlement between tobacco companies and state governments. 90 Over the twentieth century, the tobacco industry successfully defended tort and product liability claims pursued by smokers and their families. 91 However, presenting the claims in restitution allowed lawyers to structure the suit so that the state rather than the (at fault) smoker was the named plaintiff. 92 Combining law and economics reasoning with traditional restitution theory, the states claimed that the tobacco companies were unjustly enriched because they did not internalize the costs of the adverse health effects of smoking. Since these expenses were ultimately borne by the public, the states claimed restitution from the tobacco industry. 93 Though these claims never received judicial sanction, restitution had a hand in producing one of the first major victories against the tobacco companies. Other factors no doubt contributed: the emergence of critical "smoking gun" documents; the testimony of insider whistleblowers; and a general shift in public sentiment. But by naming the state rather than the smoker as the plaintiff, the restitutionary cause of action substantially changed the underlying equities and pushed the tobacco companies towards settlement.
A final source of redistributive restitution relates to the division of property belonging to unmarried cohabitants. Here, Canadian rather than American law offers the most telling examples. 
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The Canadian experience thus offers a mid-point between U.S. and Commonwealth modes of thought. On the one hand, Canadian doctrine exhibits its North American tendencies, using common law courts to pursue a social agenda through private law litigation.
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On the other hand, many scholars who adhere to the restrained, analytic view of restitution argue that the Canadian approach distorts the confined boundaries of unjust enrichment. 98 93 Id. at 853. 94 In the U.S. these questions proceed under a variety of statutory and common law principles, most probably this is because restitution is not a compelling enough framework to serve as a doctrinal rallying point for this area of law. A comprehensive summary of cases that demonstrates the lack of any cohering principle in U.S. law can be found at George Blum 100 This is not to suggest that there is no technical analysis in these cases, but only that the technical analysis does not revolve around the analytics of restitution. Rather, the legalistic analysis focuses on procedural issues: e.g., standing, subject matter jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, federal question, forum non conveniens, failure to join necessary parties, and a host of discovery related issues. See, e.g., In Re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F.Supp. above, it shares in the skepticism of classical doctrinal reasoning. 102 Therefore, the Commonwealth approach to restitution is (albeit for different reasons) equally unpersuasive to center-right contingent of the American ideological spectrum.
The differences between Birksean and law and economics approaches is best captured by comparing Birks' Introduction, with an article published the same year by Saul Levmore, a leading first-generation law and economics figure.
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At first glance, the authors share many of the same concerns. Both Birks and Levmore are troubled by the conceptual disarray prevailing within restitution, as well as the lack of any apparent theory guiding judicial decisions.
contents embody the core goals of all of the private law-promoting efficient transactions. The thinking is thus fully instrumentalist; restitution is granted only when a particular remedy in the case at bar encourages market behavior downstream.
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In a more recent account, Richard Craswell further demonstrates the irrelevance of traditional legal categories to law and economics. 107 Craswell argues that the goal of any remedial regime (reliance, restitution or expectation) is to produce damage awards whose total economic impact incentivizes the most socially productive behavior. In this view, doctrinal headings traditionally associated with specific measures of damages serve no purpose; they simply distract the law from addressing the underlying empirical question at hand. Rather than fret about the causative basis of liability, Craswell argues that legal analysis should be geared towards identifying which measure of damages will optimize socially productive behavior. 108 The economic analysis presents a mirror image of the Commonwealth reasoning.
Under Birks' analysis, contract, tort, and restitution provide the "causative event" which justifies the award of damages.
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Craswell, by contrast, begins (and ends) his analysis with the amount in damages that should be awarded-the "source of liability" or "causative basis" never even enters the equation. Much the same is true of the law and economics approaches to property. Whereas Birks sees property as a foundational institution predicated on a fixed set of "orthodox principles," 110 Calabresi and Malamed famously argue that property rights should be conceived as freely defeasible interests which are economically equivalent (and fully interchangeable) with rights or duties stemming from contract and tort. 111 Under this framework, the decision whether to grant a proprietary or personal remedy has nothing to do with the technical (and indeterminate) rules of property and/or trust, but depends on which form of relief will actively encourage the parties to bargain towards an efficient resolution. In line with law and economics principles, these cases reject the unjust enrichment framing and focus instead on the legal rule that encourages the most efficient deployment of precautionary measures or recourse to market-based correctives. The Principles of Restitution. The English writers telegraph that whatever its substantive merits, the question of unmarried cohabitants is a legislative problem that cannot be solved though private law litigation. 120 In line with the expansive definition of restitution pursued by the redistributive restitutionalists, Restatement § 28 supports claims for restitution between unmarried cohabitants. 121 The Restatement is fully aware of the tension between the confined image of restitution and the unbounded, equitable flavor of § 28. Thus "fundamental principles of restitution" must be "perceptibly relaxed" to accommodate this recovery within the Restatement's overarching conceptual scheme. 122 In America, even the most doctrinally oriented scholarship cannot avoid employing private law doctrines to structure social policy. Following Birks, the English courts held that since the ultra vires contracts were void, and thus irrelevant, the swaps contracts were to be analyzed as cases of mistaken 125 Id. at 10. 126 Id. at 4, (citing Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985) ). 127 Id. 128 Id. at 9. Kull's academic analysis works its way into Restatement's section 2 which claims that "transactions that give rise to a liability in restitution . . . take place outside the framework of an enforceable contract or otherwise without the effective consent of one or both of the parties. 
VII. Conclusion
The Restatement stakes out a middle position by taking the core of the Birksean frame and modifying it to comport with more realist U.S. sensibilities. For this reason, the Restatement represents the most promising attempt to reestablish restitution within U.S. legal consciousness. Thus the Restatement's reception into the fabric of American legal thought serves as a reasonable proxy for assessing the future of restitution in America more generally.
At one level, the Restatement is an unqualified success. It usefully collects and summarizes a number of diffuse and little understood doctrines into a concise, handy compendium. Viewed as a thought-out, clear and up to date treatise on the law of restitution, the Restatement is an unqualified success. Therefore, to the extent courts conceptualize their cases as raising restitution issues, they will look to the Restatement; especially given the lack of alternate sources of guidance and the overall lack of competence in the field. Similarly, the influence of the legal economists will likely channel courts towards the values of efficiency and finality and away from rewinding transactions as to correct unjust enrichment. Hard questions will be resolved by placing the risk of loss on the cheapest cost avoider, or by structuring relief so as to incentivize market transactions, so that unjust enrichment barely enters the equation. Crossing over to the other end of the spectrum, it is difficult to imagine that a large scale redistributive project (which 132 See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995) ("To put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law professors included) do not know what restitution is. The subject is no longer taught in law schools, and the lawyer who lacks an introduction to its basic principles is unlikely to recognize them in practice. The technical competence of published opinions in straightforward restitution cases has noticeably declined; judges and lawyers sometimes fail to grasp the rudiments of the doctrine even when they know where to find it."). 133 consciously looks to stretch the limits of exiting doctrine) will be derailed because it does not conformably fit into the Restatement's positivized conception of restitution.
Much the same can be said of the American "law of restitution" itself. To the extent that some issues are conceptualized as restitution questions, the law of restitution will exist and perhaps even thrive. And as Lon Fuller pointed out, the moral intuition encapsulated by the term "unjust enrichment" will continue to play a role in working out legal questions no matter what doctrinal heading is formally in play. But I do not foresee that courts will begin to conceptualize contract, bankruptcy, corporate, intellectual property or U.C.C. questions in terms of restitution. The anti-doctrinalism exhibited by both sides of the ideological divide renders the American legal landscape inhospitable to the analytical insights offered by the Commonwealth's account of restitution.
One final note to drive this point home. Over the past two generations, nearly every American innovation in legal thought has been built on decidedly post-realist foundations. Maturing and emerging fields include: animal law, art law, health care law, child law, elder law, various forms of cyber and computer law, disability law, environmental law, Indian law, natural resource law, lawyering for the President, terrorism and the law, WTO law-to name but a few. restitution is framed around the legal-analytical category of unjust enrichment. This organization is more in-line with the classical scheme of the late nineteenth century when law was considered in terms of tort, contract, agency, partnership, bailments, sales, property, equity and trusts; the doctrinal subjects that have fallen far out of scholarly favor in the U.S.
For this reason, it is perhaps not surprising that an informal poll of professors at two of the top five ranked U.S. law schools revealed that roughly half were completely unaware of the ongoing Restatement of Restitution project. 135 There has likewise been little scholarly reaction to the Restatement (compared say, to the Restatement Third of Torts), and roughly half of the commentary that does exist is anchored, at least in part, outside the U.S. 136 As I have argued, the Commonwealth approach to restitution is largely predicated on a pre-realist conception of legal thought that overlooks much of twentieth century American legal scholarship, and is therefore unlikely to become of significant interest to American scholars and judges.
